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STUDENT ARTICLES
Using Gestational Surrogacy and Pre-
Implantation Genetic Diagnosis: Are
Intended Parents Now Manufacturing The
Idyllic Infant?
By Jami L. Zehr*
I. Introduction
Twenty years ago a radical feminist criticized surrogacy,
stating, "[t]he rise of the surrogate industry does not take place in
isolation. It is part of the industrialization of reproduction. It is part of
the opening up of the 'reproductive supermarket."l Radical feminists
contend that surrogacy is an exploitation of women's reproductive
capabilities.2 They argue that women become mere fetal containers,
controlled by men who have the "vital fluid" needed for production
of children, now seen as mere commodities, in order to further a
male's genetic future.
3
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' DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS 77 (Harvard Business School Press,
2006) (quoting RECONSTRUCTING BABYLON: ESSAYS ON WOMEN AND
TECHNOLOGY 131 (H. Patricia Hynes ed. Bloomington, TN: Indiana Univ. Press,
1991)).
2 Christine L. Kerian, Surrogacy: A Last Resort Alternative for Infertile
Women or a Commodification of Women's Bodies and Children, 12 WIS. WOMEN'S
L.J. 113, 161-62 (1997).
3 JANICE G. RAYMOND, WOMEN AS WOMBS 31, 35 (HarperCollins Paperback
Ed. 1994); Kerian, supra note 2, at 154; Jeremy J. Richey, Comment, A
Troublesome Good Idea: An Analysis of the Illinois Gestational Surrogacy Act, 30
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Persuasive arguments against these contentions show that
they unduly rely on a presumption that women are unable to protect
themselves from exploitation. The debate about surrogacy often
overlooks the infertile woman who has the ability to create a child but
is subsequently unable to carry the child to term.4 In 2002 the
National Survey of Family Growth data on infertility indicated that
two percent of women of reproductive age had an infertility-related
doctor's appointment. 5 Surrogacy may be the infertile woman's only
chance at a biological child.
6
Views toward surrogacy have evolved over the years as new
technology emerged so that now both legislatures and courts provide
protection for surrogacy contracts. 7 For example, in 2005 Illinois
enacted a controversial new Gestational Surrogacy Act that provides
contractual rights to parties involved in gestational surrogacy. Most
importantly, it expressly allows for compensation of the surrogate
above medical and legal expenses.8 In addition, the right to contract
is a right women should be allowed to exercise as equal citizens
under the Constitution, to affirm they have the same intelligence as
men to control their lives, and the same right to privacy and control
over their bodies. 9 This shift in the attitude toward surrogacy
indicates that viewing assisted reproductive technology as a market is
no longer an unacceptable position. l Below is a discussion on what
assisted reproductive technologies and procedures entail. The
S. ILL. U. L.J. 169, 190 (2005).
4 Kerian, supra note 2, at 162.
5 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, 2005 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY (ART) SUCCESS RATES
3 (October 2007) available at http://www.cdc.gov/ART/ART2005/508PDF/
2005ART508.pdf (last visited February 12, 2008).
6 Kerian, supra note 2, at 162.
7 See Court Decisions, Assisted Conception: No Public Policy Violated by
Gestational Surrogacy Contract, 34 FAM. L. REP. 8, 1087, 1087 (2008) available at
http://pubs.bna.com/NWSSTND/IP/BNA/flr.nsf/SearchAllView/BD 1 9DD84BD4A
849D852573BF00798940?Open&highlight-ASSISTED,CONCEPTON (last
visited on February 12, 2008). On December 20th 2007 the Ohio Supreme Court
concluded that gestational surrogacy does not violate public policy.
8 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/25(d)(3)-(4) (West 2007).
9 See Kerian, supra note 2, at 163; Amy M. Larkey, Note, Redefining
Motherhood: Determining Legal Maternity in Gestational Surrogacy
Arrangements, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 605, 616-18 (2003).
1o See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.
2008]
Loyola Consumer Law Review
discussion also includes a look at the law that has evolved, both
seminal cases and specific statutes, regarding surrogacy. Finally, this
article discusses the policy implications concerning infertile couples
as consumers and surrogates as economic beings both generally and
specific to the Gestational Surrogacy Act of Illinois.
II. Alternative Family Building
A. Assisted Reproductive Technology
Individuals who have the desire to create and raise children of
their own but because of medical reasons or alternative lifestyle
choices are not able to naturally reproduce must resort to alternative
methods of reproduction or adopt. 1 The focus of this paper is on the
alternative methods which are universally referred to as assisted
reproductive technology ("ART"), specifically the technology of in
vitro fertilization ("IVF") surrogacy, also referred to as gestational12
surrogacy. ART has been defined as any "medical procedure
designed to bring about a conception without sexual intercourse" and
is often used by heterosexual couples that have infertility issues or
homosexual couples unable to biological reproduce.' 
3
ART includes artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization,
embryo transfer, and third party reproduction (sperm donor, egg
14donor, and surrogacy). Because surrogacy is one of the key focuses
of this article, third party reproduction will be discussed separately.' 
5
Artificial insemination is the process where "semen is inserted into a
woman's vagina by some means other than intercourse" and can be
semen of either the recipient's husband/partner or a donor. 16 These
two types of artificial insemination are called, respectively,
Debra J. Braselton & Maxine Weiss Kunz, Non-Traditional Families and
Alternative Family Building: Securing Parental Rights for Intended Parents, 20
DCBA BRIEF 30, 30 (2007); Steven H. Snyder & Mary Patricia Byrn, The Use of
Prebirth Parentage Orders in Surrogacy Proceedings, 39 FAM. L.Q. 633, 636
(2005).
12 Braselton & Weiss Kunz, supra note 11, at 30.
"3 Id. at 36.
14 Id.
15 See discussion infra I.B. 1.
16 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 121 (8th Ed. 2004).
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homologous artificial insemination and heterologous insemination.' 7
Because of public policy, in Illinois, parentage rights of children are
carefully decided and worded legally. 8 Under the Illinois Parentage
Act if a woman is heterologously artificially inseminated the
resulting child is considered the naturally conceived and legitimate
child of the woman and her husband. 19 If a woman is homologously
artificially inseminated and her husband consents to the insemination
then he is considered the natural father of any resulting child as long
as the procedure is under supervision of a licensed physician.
20
IVF occurs when a woman is given hormones that create a
large number of fertilized eggs that are surgically removed, fertilized
in a laboratory, and then either implanted in a woman or frozen for
later use. 2 1 This new technology allows for a three-part process of
conception.22 Sperm or egg can now be from the intended individual
or couple, or from donors and then implanted into either the intended
mother or a surrogate. IVF is an expensive process, therefore
doctors create more pre-embryos than are needed and store them for
later use if that particular cycle does not take. 24 Embryo transfer is
one part of the IVF cycle, and can be done from previous cycles of
the removal of and fertilization of a matured egg.25
171Id.
18 See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/1.1 (West 2007).
'9 See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/2.
20 See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/3.
21 Braselton & Weiss Kunz, supra note 11, at 38.
22 SPAR, supra note 1, at 78.
23 See id. at 78-79. Intended parent is a person that "enters into a gestational
surrogacy contract with a gestational surrogate pursuant to which he or she will be
the legal parent of the resulting child." 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/10.
24 Braselton & Weiss Kunz, supra note 11, at 38-39; IVF average $8,000 to
$15,000 per cycle of maturation and extraction, however embryo transfer is not as
expensive because it does not require the same amount of laboratory process and
retrieval of hormonally matured eggs that a full IVF requires. Id. at 38.
25 Braselton & Weiss Kunz, supra note 11, at 38.
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B. Third-Party Reproduction
1. Donors: Sperm and Egg
Donors, according to the Illinois Gestational Surrogacy Act,
are "individuals who contribute a gamete or gametes for the purpose
of in vitro fertilization or implantation in another," i.e. donated eg s
or sperm donation which is also used for artificial insemination. 
6
For artificial insemination men donate their sperm to sperm banks
which store the specimen under federal regulation. A couple
wishing to use donated sperm in conjunction with artificial
insemination select a particular donor at a sperm bank which usually
charges a fee for the specimen and will show the intended individual
or couple a list that reveals some of the donor's characteristics.28
Men have been donating sperm to commercial sperm banks
for over thirty years. 29 As in most ART components, sperm donation
began in a non-profit capacity but moved to for-profit when it
became apparent that there was a demand for artificial insemination
from donated sperm for couples where the husband could not produce
sperm, where men had genetic diseases, or where single women
wanted to raise children.30 Clinics came to realize that by moving
sperm banks to a market system, the quantity and quality of the
sperm supply could be controlled and improved. Individuals or
couples who chose to use donated sperm as a solution to their
infertility problems, along with artificial insemination, no longer had
to choose a man to father their child but simply had to choose
sperm. 32
Egg donation came about as a result of IVF. 33 While initially
IVF was used to create a medical miracle for couples who were
26 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/10.
27 SPAR, supra note 1, at 37.
28 Id. at 37.
29 Id. at 35 (explaining that the first for-profit sperm bank opened in 1970 in
Minnesota).
30 Id. at 36.
31 Id. at 36.
32 SPAR, supra note 1, at 36 (explaining commercial artificial insemination of
donated sperm replaced intended parent's dependence on friends and family with
anonymity and quality control).
31 Id at 42.
298 [Vol. 20:3
Gestational Surrogacy
capable of producing sperm and egg, but lacked the ability to join the
two, doctors and infertile individuals began to see another use for it.
34
Egg donation is where the eggs of a woman are taken from her and
implanted into another. 35 The two women's hormonal systems are
coordinated using pharmaceutical hormones, then the eggs are
surgically removed, fertilized, and the donor egg is implanted in the
infertile woman, a solution to infertility problems that is similar to
artificial insemination using donated sperm. 36 Both techniques solve
an individual or couple's infertility problem using donated gametes.
2. Surrogacy: Traditional and Gestational
With the introduction of artificial insemination, sex was
theoretically removed from the process of conception. 37 Surrogacy
became the contractual deal whereby one woman is impregnated with
the intention of giving the child to another individual or couple after
carrying to term any child resulting from conception.38 Therefore,
surrogacy evolved into a medical procedure where it was possible to
be impregnated without sexual intercourse.
39
There are two types of surrogacy: traditional and gestational.
Black's Law Dictionary defines traditional surrogacy as a "pregnancy
in which a woman provides her own egg, which is fertilized by
artificial insemination, and carries the fetus and gives birth to a child
for another person."4 0 Before IVF became a reliable option, the only
available similar technology for infertile women was artificial
insemination of a surrogate.4' Thus, traditional surrogacy is often
called artificial insemination surrogacy.42 However, the surrogate has
a genetic link to the child because her own egg is used for
conception.43 The presumption at law is that the surrogate as birth
34 id.
35 id.
36 Id.
37 SPAR, supra note 1, at 75.
38 Braselton & Weiss Kunz, supra note 11, at 39.
39 SPAR, supra note 1, at 75.
40 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1485 (8th Ed. 2004).
41 Snyder & Byrn, supra note 11, at 639.
42 Kerian, supra note 2, at 114.
43 Snyder & Bym, supra note 11, at 639.
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mother and genetic mother of the resulting child has presumptive
parental rights. 4 The intended mother has no genetic link and
therefore no presumptive parental rights to the child.45 Because the
surrogate has preexisting presumptive rights, the intended mother
must adopt the child and the surrogate must give up her parental
rights.46
If the intended father's sperm is used instead of a donor, the
intended father, as the biological father, has presumptive legal
parental rights.4 7 However, the surrogate's husband also may have
presumptive legal parental rights of the child.4 8 The intended father,
through his genetic link must establish paternity through his
presumptive rights and then the intended mother can establish a legal
relationship through stepparent adoption proceedings. 49 Traditional
surrogacy arrangements gave rise to legal conflicts when the
biological and birth mother refused to give up the child after coming
to regret being a surrogate. 50 Because the focus of this article
revolves around the Illinois Gestational Surrogacy Act and those
policy implications, the specific policy problems of traditional
surrogacy will be discussed as they relate or contrast to policy
implications of gestational surrogacy and are not a separate
discussion.
Gestational Surrogacy, also called commercial surrogacy, is
where the sperm of the intended father fertilizes the egg of the
intended mother outside the uterus. 51 The pre-embryo is then
transferred to the gestational surrogate who carries any resulting child
to term for the intended parents. Unlike in traditional surrogacy,
the child is usually genetically linked to both intended parents and
never to the gestational surrogate.53
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Snyder & Byrn, supra note 11, at 639.
49 Id.
50. Larkey, supra note 9, at 610.
5 Kerian, supra note 2, at 114.
52 Id.
53 Id.
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Under the Illinois Gestational Surrogacy Act, for the contract
to be valid, the surrogacy must meet the State's definition of
gestational surrogacy.54 Illinois defines gestational surrogacy as the
"process by which a woman attempts to carry and give birth to a
child created through in vitro fertilization using the gamete or
gametes of at least one of the intended parents and to which the
gestational surrogate has no genetic contributions."' 55 This is often the
preferred ART method when an intended mother cannot carry a child.
This is because the child then has a genetic link to at least one of the
intended parents who desire a biological child, and no relationship to
the surrogate.
56
Additionally, this genetic link with the intended parent(s)
creates a stronger presumptive legal parental right for the infertile
individuals and a weaker legal argument if the surrogate would wish
to change her mind.57 Because of the increase in medical options
available using IVF and a stronger legal right through genetics when
using gestational surrogacy, traditional surrogacy arrangements have
become disfavored.58 Intended parents, because of their genetic link
to the child when using gestational surrogacy, can often establish
parentage rights through a single proceeding.59 This allows the
presumptive parentage rights of a surrogate and her spouse to be
nullified.60
Commercial surrogacy involves surrogacy agreements that
include compensation to the surrogate from the intended parents for
the surrogate's service. Often gestational surrogacy is called
commercial surrogacy because the contractual reimbursements are
contrasted to altruistic family or informal surrogacy arrangements.
62
Commercial surrogacy compensation generally includes
54 See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/5 (West 2007).
55 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/10.
56 Larkey, supra note 9, at 611.
57 id.
58 Snyder & Byrn, supra note 11, at 640.
51 Id. at 641.
60 Id.
61 Larkey, supra note 9, at 608.
62 Id.
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reimbursement for living expenses, medical expenses, life insurance
and compensation for gestating the child.63
IVF surrogacy (i.e. gestational or commercial surrogacy)
"creat[ed] a substitute with far greater commercial potential" and
split conception into a three-part process: sperm, egg, and womb.64
Women could sell their eggs without having to become pregnant and
could carry and birth children with whom they did not have a genetic
relation. 6 5 By separating the process into two separate components
women became more willing to donate their services to individuals
and couples in need of ART.
C. Pre-implantation Genetic Diagnosis
Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis ("PGD") is used in
conjunction with IVF and Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection ("ICSI"),
a method where technicians choose one sperm and implant it into one
egg creating an embryo, to give individuals with genetic defects a67
chance at having a healthy child. ICSI is used because of its higher
success rate in fertility clinics compared to other forms of ART. 68
PGD combines genetic technology and the basic IVF procedure by
creating an embryo outside of a uterus and then testing it for certain
genetic defects at the earliest stage possible.
69
Technicians evaluate a pre-embryo, when the pre-embryo is at
an eight-cell stage, by extracting a single cell to test it for certain
63 According to International Assisted Reproduction Center website, whose
information is typical of other websites regarding commercial surrogacy, a
surrogate is usually reimbursed $13,000 to $25,000 for her gestational services on
top of program expenses which include everything from mental health evaluations,
life insurance, and medical insurance to maternity clothing.
http://www.fertilityhelp.comCM/Surrogacy/EstimatedExpenses For Complete_
SurrogacyProgram.asp (last visited March 30, 2008).
64 SPAR, supra note 1, at 78.
65 Id. at 79 (explaining that now women can donate eggs or can gestate a child
without a genetic link verses traditional surrogacy which required a woman to be
willing to do both).
66 Id. at 80.
67 Id. at 62; G.M. Adam, Assisted Human Reproduction - Legal Rights of the
Unborn in Respect of Avoidable Damage, 26 MED. & L. 325, 334 (2007).
68 SPAR, supra note 1, at 62; Adam, supra note 67, at 334.
69 SPAR, supra note 1, at 114; Adam, supra note 67, at 335.
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genetic information. 70 These certain genetic traits that can be
determined include a range of diseases, the sex of the pre-embryo,
and whether the pre-embryo has Down syndrome. 7 1 Because the pre-
embryo must be implanted within twenty-four hours of the testing, in
a PGD procedure, time is limited and room for error limited as well.72
The genetic material available from the intended parents or
donors limits the use this technology.73 PGD is also limited by
medical advances discussed above, and generally viewed as simply
one more option available to individuals who wish to have a
biological child but do not wish to pass on certain genetic diseases, it
is not the chance to design a perfect child.74 For example, infertile
individuals or couples who wish to have healthy children use lists
available, which contain the genetic traits of the donors, and select
certain genetic traits from these egg and sperm donors to determine
which traits they hope will create that healthy child.75 Similarly, PGD
allows for the selection of the healthiest candidate available from the
few pre-embryos created by the genetic make-up of the intended
individual, parents, or donors.76
III. The Law and Surrogacy
A. Seminal Cases
One of the most influential surrogacy cases was In re Baby M
where the New Jersey Supreme Court decidedly disfavored
gestational surrogacy as illegal, possibly criminal, and "potentially
degrading to women." 77 After this decision state legislatures began
banning surrogacy, and it was not until the Supreme Court of
California decided Johnson v. Calvert that states began to look at
70 SPAR, supra note 1, at 114-15.
71 Id. at 78.
721Id. at 115.
73 COLIN GAVAGHAN, DEFENDING THE GENETIC SUPERMARKET 8 (Sheila A.M.
McLean ser. ed. Biomedical Law & Ethics Library 2007).
74 Id. at 7.
75 SPAR, supra note 1, at 99.
76 GAVAGHAN, supra note 73, at 7.
77 In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1234 (N.J. 1988).
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gestational surrogacy contracts as something other than abhorrent. 78
Instead of looking at the best interest of the child, as many courts had
been for years under an adoption family law principle, the California
Supreme Court looked at the intent of the parties involved because
surrogacy contracts involved "two informed parties who deal at arm's
length for a mutually beneficial contract" and a contractual analysis
with an intent-based standard seemed most suitable for the unique
circumstances presented. 79 The decision by this court that the intent
of the parties controlled was precedent setting and the most
influential case since the introduction of new technology and In re
Baby M.80 Both seminal cases are discussed in some detail below.
1. In re Baby M
In re Baby M is the seminal case regarding compensation for
traditional surrogacy where the New Jersey Supreme Court decided
that because the "surrogate was both the genetic and birth mother of
the child, she was the child's sole legal mother." 81 The court
determined that because the woman conceived, brought to term, and
delivered the child she was the natural mother and to be forever
separate her from the child was against public policy.8 2 Therefore,
the contract providing for such an "inappropriately called....
'surrogate mother"' was invalid. 83
In this case the surrogate was artificially inseminated with the
intended father's sperm, contracted to carry the resulting child to
term, deliver the child to the intended parents, and to terminate her
parental rights. 84  Because Mrs. Stem had multiple sclerosis the
Stems determined the risks inherent in her being pregnant were too
substantial. 85  They initially considered adoption but were
discouraged by some potential problems involved and looked for
78 Kerian, supra note 2, at 128.
71 d. at 123.
80 Id.
81 Snyder & Byrn, supra note 11, at 650.
82 In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1234.
83 Id.
84 1d. at 1235.
85 Id.
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some other means to start a family. 86 The Stems decided surrogacy
was their best option and contracted with Mrs. Whitehead to be
artificially inseminated with Stem's sperm and to terminate her
parental rights and give up the child. 87 The Stems contracted to pay
her ten thousand dollars for her services. 
88
Initially Mrs. Whitehead turned the child over to the Stems,
however she became despondent and convinced the Stems to let her
live with the child for a short period, but thereafter did not hand the
child back to the Stems.89 Mr. Stem filed suit seeking to enforce the
surrogacy contract. 90 Eventually the Supreme Court of New Jersey
decided that only where a woman voluntarily agrees to be a surrogate
mother, without payment or contractual obligations to surrender any
resulting child, would the public policy and state statutes not be
offended. 91
The surrogate was the natural mother of the child, but custody
was given to Mr. Stem in the best interest of the child and the case
was remanded to determine the visitation rights of Mrs. Whitehead. 92
As a result, adoption law policies decide all surrogacy arrangements
in New Jersey, even gestational surrogacy. 93 While In re Baby Mwas
the seminal case regarding traditional surrogacy the court in Johnson
v. Calvert revisited the issues of surrogacy in the seminal case
concerning gestational surrogacy.
94
2. Johnson v. Calvert
In Johnson v. Calvert the Supreme Court of California
determined that both the intended mother and the surrogate had
shown they had valid parentage claims under state statutes, so the
intent of the parties, as shown by the surrogacy contract, controlled
86 Id. at 1236.
87 In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1236.
88 id.
89 Id. at 1236-37.
90 Id. at 1237.
9' Id. at 1235.
92 In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1234-35.
93 Snyder & Byrn, supra note 11, at 649.
94 Kerian, supra note 2, at 13 1.
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who was awarded legal custody of the child.95 The intended mother,
Crispina Calvert, was not medically able to gestate a child due to a
hysterectomy even though her ovaries still had the ability to produce
eggs, so Mrs. Calvert and her husband Mark Calvert agreed to a
surrogacy arrangement with a woman named Anna Johnson. 96 All
three parties signed a contract that an embryo of the Calverts gametes
would be implanted in Ms. Johnson and she would relinquish all her
parental rights, and they would take the resulting child home. 97 The
Calverts agreed to pay Ms. Johnson for her services and to pay for a
life insurance policy.
However, relations between the Calverts and Ms. Johnson
deteriorated and eventually she demanded the payment of the balance
due her and threatened to refuse to hand the child over to the
Calverts. 99 Both sides brought a suit seeking to declare themselves
the legal parents of the child. 100 At trial the parties stipulated that the
Calverts were the genetic parents of the child after a blood test result
excluded Ms. Johnson as the biological mother. 101
Both Ms. Johnson, as the child's birth mother, and Mrs.
Calvert, as the child's genetic mother, could presumptively show that
they were the legal mother under state statute. 102 So both women had
a valid claim, but under California law only one woman could be
recognized as the legal mother of a child. 103 Because both women
presented acceptable proof of their maternal rights, the Court decided
that the case could only be decided by looking into the intent of the
parties as manifested in the surrogacy contract. 1°4 The intent of the
parties was essential in deciding the case because, but for the
intention of the Calverts to have a child, Ms. Johnson would not have
had the opportunity to gestate a child and later change her mind, and
95 Larkey, supra note 9, at 622-23.
96 Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993).
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778.
102 Id. at 779, 781.
103 id.
"o Id. at 782.
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the child would not have been conceived or born. 105 Therefore, under
California law the woman who intended to procreate a child and to
raise such child as her own is the legal mother. 0 6 The public policy
issues and views spawned by these two seminal cases influenced
other states' legislative actions and judicial determinations with
regard to traditional and gestational surrogacy. 107
B. State Statutes
Surrogacy contracts have been banned in countries such as
Germany and France, as well as, several Australian states and have
been restricted in others such as Canada, Israel, and the United
Kingdom. 108 However, there is no federal governmental regulation of
surrogacy contracts in the United States, and as a result the law has
developed state by state in a piecemeal fashion. These varied legal
approaches are the result of "competing social, moral, and political
interest" with the advent and use of third-party reproduction
technologies. 0 9  Four different theories regarding third-party
reproduction assistance drive the public policies behind the different
state statutes. "10 First, the intent based theory defines the legal mother
by the intent of the parties, i.e. the commissioning mother."' The
reasoning behind this theory is that but for the intended couple the
child would not have been conceived, so the intended mother, as the
one who originally wanted the child, should be the mother that raises
the child. 12 Opponents to the intent theory point out that this theory
ignores the best interests of the child and intents often change.11 3 A
second public policy theory is the genetic contribution theory in
which maternity is determined according to biology."14 The woman
whose gamete contributed to conception determines the maternity of
1o5 id.
106 Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782.
107 See Kerian, supra note 2, at 123.
108 SPAR, supra note 1, at 71.
'09 Snyder & Byrn, supra note 11, at 633.
10 Larkey, supra note 9, at 622.
1 Id.; see discussion infra III.A.2.
112 Larkey, supra note 9, at 623.
113 Id. at 624.
114 Id.
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the child." 5 A third theory is the gestational mother preference
theory in which the woman who gives birth is presumed to have
maternity rights.1 16 Supporters of this theory point out that it
safeguards against unfair contract, but opponents argue that it
interferes with the individual or intended couples private reproductive
affairs. 117 The fourth theory is similar to adoption public policy in
which the interest of the child is controlling in awarding parental
rights. 118 However, the problem with this theory is the question of
whether courts should decide legal parentage rights based on its
decision as to the parental qualification of the parties." 9
States have taken different approaches to surrogacy contracts.
Some expressly exempt gestational surrogacy contracts from other
provisions that criminalize the sale of babies, others refuse to enforce
surrogacy contracts, still others refuse to enforce them only if the
surrogate receives compensation, and finally some only prohibit
payment to intermediaries.' 
20
California has no statute governing surrogacy, but it expressly
allows for pre-birth maternity and paternity orders if the intended
parents are genetically related under Johnson v. Calvert.12 1 New
Jersey has a statute governing surrogacy, but it does not expressly
prohibit surrogacy agreements. Instead it contains language that
stays all parentage orders until the child's birth at which time
parentage is controlled by the decision in In re Baby M 122 New
Hampshire, Virginia, Texas, and Utah have enacted statutes that
authorize and regulate surrogacy contracts but require judicial pre-
115 Id.
116 Id. at 625.
117 Larkey, supra note 9, at 625.
1 " d. at 626.
119 Id.
120 Jennifer L. Watson, Note, Growing a Baby for Sale or Merely Renting a
Womb: Should Surrogate Mothers be Compensated for Their Services?, 6
WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 529, 533-35 (2007).
121 Snyder & Byrn, supra note 11, at 643-44; see CAL. FAM. CODE § 7648.9
(West 1975) (stating "[t]his article does not establish a basis for setting aside or
vacating a judgment establishing paternity with regard to a child conceived by
artificial insemination.. .or a child conceived pursuant to a surrogacy agreement.").
122 Snyder & Byrn, supra note 11, at 649-50; see N.J. STAT ANN. § 9:17-45(e)
(West 1998).
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authorization before the pregnancy is initiated. 123 New Hampshire
allows for surrogacy agreements, but the surrogate has seventy-two
hours after giving birth to change her mind. 1 4 Florida authorizes
certain types of surrogacy such as gestational surrogacy for married
couples when the intended mother cannot safely gestate a pregnancy
so long as the surrogate is uncompensated, in addition, the parentage
of the child cannot be determined until after the child's birth. 125 On
the other hand, the District of Columbia, Indiana, Michigan, and New
York have statues prohibiting surrogacy contracts of any type.1
26
These statutes not only prohibit such contracts but also impose fines
on compensation agreements, and in some states a second time
offense is a felony. 1' In 2005, Illinois became the first state to enact
a statute expressly allowing for compensation in gestational
surrogacy contracts. 128
C. Illinois Statute
Under the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 public policy
recognizes that every child has the right to "physical, mental
emotional, and monetary support" by his or her parent(s).124
Therefore, it is imperative that parental rights are determined upon
the birth of the child, especially if surrogacy is involved. Public
policy demands these children be supported and public policy and
law determine who has this responsibility, right, and privilege.
Illinois follows the intent of the contracting parties theory because
even if the requirements of the Gestational Surrogacy Act are not met
123 Snyder & Byrn, supra note 11, at 651; see N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B
(1990); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 160.751-63, 756 (Vernon 2001); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 20-156, 158(D) (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-45g-801, 803 (2005).
124 Snyder & Byrn, supra note 11, at 651; see N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-
B:25(IV) (1990).
125 Snyder & Byrn, supra note 11, at 655-56; see FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 742,
743.15-16 (West 1993).
126 Snyder & Byrn, supra note 11, at 656; see D.C. CODE ANN.§ 16-402(a)
(1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.855 (West 1988); N.Y. DOM. REL. Law §
122 (McKinney's 1992); IND. CODE § 31-20-1-1 (1997).
127 Snyder & Bym, supra note 11, at 656-57; see N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §
123(2)(b) (McKinney 1992).
128 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/25(d)(3)-(4) (West 2007).
129 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/1.1.
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a court of competent jurisdiction determines the parentage of the
child based on the parties' intent.' 
30
Prior to the Gestational Surrogacy Act, the birth mother was
presumed to be the mother of a child, and the birth mother's husband
was presumed to be the father of the child. 13 The intended parents
could establish their parental rights if all parties involved certified
that the intended parents were the biological parents of the child, the
surrogate was a gestational surrogate, a physician certified that the
intended parents were the biological parents, and all of these
certifications were recorded before the child was born. 1 32 But if these
conditions were not met, then the intended parents were forced to file
a parentage action to establish the child's biology. 
133
In 2005, the Illinois legislature wanted to create a statute that
provided for the best interests of children with regards to the new
ART and who would be responsible for the children's welfare. 134 It
clarified pre-birth parental rights with regards to gestational
surrogacy by enacting the Gestational Surrogacy Act. 135 The
Gestational Surrogacy Act also protects parties to a gestational
surrogacy contract by providing standards and safeguards to facilitate
the use of such contracts. 1
36
While, the new act amended the Parentage Act of 1984
slightly, most of the Parentage Act remains unchanged.' 37 For
example, a birth mother is still the presumed mother of a child except
as under the new Gestational Surrogacy Act.' 38  In the case of
gestational surrogacy, the intended mother is the presumed mother,
the intended father is the presumed father, and the child is the
legitimate child of the intended parent(s) immediately upon the birth
of the child. 39 The intended parent(s) have sole custody upon the
130 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/25(e).
131 Nancy Ford, The New Illinois Gestational Surrogacy Act, 93 ILL. B.J. 240,
240-41 (2005).
132 Ford, supra note 131, at 241.
133 id.
134 Richey, supra note 3, at 178-79.
135 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/5.
136 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/5.
137 Ford, supra note 131, at 243.
138 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/15(a).
139 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/15(b)(1)-(4).
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birth of the child.140 Neither the gestational mother nor her husband
has any rights to the child. 14 This allows the parental rights to be
established before the birth of the child.142 The surrogate and the
intended parents must meet and certify that they meet certain
eligibility requirements before a contract will be deemed valid.
143
The surrogate must be at least twenty-one, previously have given
birth, completed a mental and medical health evaluation, undergone
independent legal consultation, and obtained health insurance. 144 The
intended parents also have certain eligibility requirements: at least
one must contribute a gamete for gestation, there must be a medical
need for the surrogacy, they must undergo health evaluations, and
they have consulted with legal counsel. 1
45
The legal remedies available for breach of a gestational
surrogate contract directs the courts to determine the new rights of
the surrogate and intended parents if the parties involved have met
the eligibility requirements and the contractual requirements of the
act.'46 All legal and equitable remedies are available to the surrogate
and the intended parent(s) except as provided in the contract,
however, the intended parents cannot seek specific performance of
the surrogate to be impregnated. 147 The contract as defining the
remedies available, notwithstanding the substantive law, further
indicates that the intent of the parties is determinative. 148 In addition,
any action to invalidate a contract regarding gestational surrogacy
must be commenced within one year after the child's birth to avoid
revocation of the contract.1
4 9
But the main controversial provisions are that it expressly
allows for compensation of a gestational surrogate, and the
compensation is to be placed in escrow prior to the implantation of
140 750 111. Comp. Stat. Ann. 47/15(b)(3).
141 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/15(b)(5)-(6).
142 H. Joseph Gitlin, Illinois: An International Magnet for Surrogacy?, 94 ILL.
B.J. 48, 48 (2006).
143 See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/25.
144 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/20(a).
145 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/20(b).
146 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/50(a).
147 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/55, 50(b).
148 Snyder & Bym, supra note 11, at 655.
149 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/70.
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the surrogate by an independent escrow agent. 15  Secondly, that
parentage rights are established prior to the child's birth without a
court proceeding or judicial overview.' 51 Additionally, there are no
residential requirements to create a valid contract for gestational
surrogacy in Illinois. 52 Finally, the act only applies to gestational
surrogacy contracts, and specifically states that a birth mother is the
presumed mother; therefore, in traditional surrogacy the intended
parents risk a later judicial custody dispute. 53
IV. Infertile Individuals as Consumers and Gestational
Surrogates as Economic Beings
A. The Right to Commercial Surrogacy as One ART
Procedure
Surrogacy has been described as the "antithesis of mainstream
fertility treatment" where most women subject themselves to
hormone treatments and ART procedures in order to give birth
themselves.154 The use of commercial surrogacy as ART is the exact
opposite; where another woman subjects herself to possible risks
inherent in IVF procedures and pregnancy for compensation by a
couple that cannot create and/or gestate children themselves. 55
Surrogacy contracts contain provisions where the birth mother
voluntarily relinquishes her parental rights, the intended parent(s)
pays the surrogate for use of her services and the intended parent(s)
takes custody upon the child's birth. 5 ; Critiques often call into
question the provision that allows gestational surrogacy fees is above
expenses involved in pregnancies, legal expenses, and life
150 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/25(a)(4); Ford, supra note 131, at 243-44.
151 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/35(a); Gitlin, supra note 142, at 48; Snyder
& Byrn, supra note 11, at 654.
152 Gitlin, supra note 142, at 48; see 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47 (West 2007).
This no residency requirement has raised questions as to whether Illinois will
become an international draw for couples wishing to have legally binding
gestational surrogacy contracts. See Gitlin, supra note 142, at 48.
153 Ford, supra note 131, at 244 & n.59.
154 SPAR, supra note 1, at 70.
155 Id.
156 Larkey, supra note 9, at 608.
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insurance.157 Commercial surrogacy, because it involves payment of
between ten thousand and fifteen thousand dollars to the surrogate,
clearly differentiated from non-commercial surrogacy, usually an
informal arrangement between people close to the intended
parent(s). 158
The many differing views regarding the ethical,
constitutional, and public policy arguments involved in commercial
surrogacy contracts center around a few particular points of
interest. 159 Some opponents argue that the use of women's
reproductive capacities, especially their uteruses, for profit is
inconsistent with the concept of human dignity.' 60 The major views
disputed regarding commercial surrogacy are constitutional rights,
exploitation of women verses the right to contract, infertility
procedures as a market, and whether PGD will lead to designer
babies.
1. Constitutional Rights
The Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut guaranteed
individuals freedom from governmental interference when making
private decisions regarding conception and rearing of children. 16
One way to determine parentage is through pre-birth orders, an
attempt to formalize commercial surrogacy proceedings for intended
parents to have a pre-determined parental right to revise their
biological children. The use of pre-birth orders gives the intended
parents control over the child and the child's postnatal care, puts
them on the original birth records, allows intended parents
participation in the child's delivery, and allows the hospital to hand
the child over to the intended parents and not the surrogate.' 6 ' Thealternative is post-birth adoption procedures where the surrogate
157 Watson, supra note 120, at 532.
158 Larkey, supra note 9, at 608.
'59 Id. at 613; see Kerian, supra note 2, at 115.
160 Kerian, supra note 2, at 153.
161 Larkey, supra note 9, at 615; see generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965) (holding there is a fundamental right to privacy in marriages, and
controlling and criminalizing the use of contraceptives, violated this right and was
therefore unconstitutional).
162 Snyder & Byrn, supra note 11, at 634.
163 Id. at 634-35.
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terminates her parental rights, the intended parents legally adopt the
child, and a new birth certificate is issued.' 4 Because public policy
gives children the right to be supported by parents, determining who
has these parental rights before the child's birth is imperative, the use
of surrogacy contracts and pre-birth orders complements public
policy and is in line with the intended parents constitutional rights.' 
65
Opponents argue in return that by entering into such
agreements fully informed, the surrogate waives her right to
privacy. 166 But surrogacy arrangements and pre-birth orders deserve
constitutional protection, because of the private nature of conception
and procreative relations of the parties, women should have control
over their own bodies, and biological parents have a right to associate
with their child. 16 7 In addition, banning surrogacy denies a woman
equal treatment, because she is an individual unable to create a child
biologically and she cannot use the form of ART that will allow her
that opportunity, while allowing ART procedures where a man is
sterile. 1-8 Women should have control over their bodies, and ignoring
the economic power of women's reproductive capacities does a
disservice to those who wish for women to enjoy equal standing. 169
It is wholly reasonable that these generous women, as economic
equal beings, should be compensated for their service and the
intended parents the constitutional right privacy in what procedures
they are willing to employ. 7
0
2. Contractual Rights
Opponents to surrogacy argue that surrogacy is the sale or
renting of the womb and this sale exploits women because it is akin
to prostitution. As in arrangements for prostitution, where awoman sells her sexual services, a surrogate sells her reproductive
164 Larkey, supra note 9, at 611.
165 See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/1.1 (West 2007).
166 Larkey, supra note 9, at 616.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 617.
169 CARMEL SHALEV, BIRTH POWER 160 (1989); Kerian, supra note 2, at 164.
170 Watson, supra note 120, at 552.
171 Kerian, supra note 2, at 158; Larkey, supra note 9, at 614.
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services for a fee.' 72 They argue poor women will flock to be
surrogates in order to make money and that if these women have a
choice between being poor or being exploited women will choose to
be exploited; therefore, there is no real choice. 173
The fee paid to the surrogate is for her gestational services
and not to buy a child; manifestation of the intent of the parties to
compensate a surrogate for her services is shown by the fact that the
intended parents pay the surrogate in installments over the course of
the pregnancy. 174 The fee is not exploitive because women should be
compensated when they render services. 175 If surrogates are being
exploited it is because they are not being paid enough for a full-time
job where the first break comes nine months and a painful delivery
later. 176 Because surrogacy fees are significantly lower than even
minimum wage rates, it is unlikely most women are motivated to be a
, 1 77gestational surrogate solely because of the financial "incentive".
Commercial surrogacy is a valuable alternative choice that
should be available to informed competent adults as consumers. 17' In
fact, denying women the right to contract freely only reinforces
paternalistic ideas about women's incapability of making a decision
or contracting. 179 Concluding that women do not have the ability to
make intelligent decisions about their bodies suggests that women
make decisions based on hormones rather than using their minds.
180
Denying women the right to make informed decisions regarding the
use of their bodies implies that they need protection legally from a
traditionally male-dominated profession to avoid exploitation of their
bodies.18 1 In addition, rather than exploiting women, the choice to
engage in commercial surrogacy as a form of employment can be
172 Larkey, supra note 9, at 614.
171 Id. at 614.
174 Kerian, supra note 2, at 154.
175 Id. at 164.
17 6 Id. at 164.
177 Watson, supra note 120, at 551.
178 Kerian, supra note 2, at 158.
179 ld. at 163.
180 Id.
181 Lisa L. Behm, Legal, Moral & International Perspectives on Surrogate
Motherhood. the Call for a Uniform Regulatory Scheme in the United States, 2
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 557, 597 (1999).
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more rewarding than other employment options that exist.1 82 The
notion that women are exploited when they sell or rent their
reproductive capacit ¢ is patronizing and reinforces the stereotype that
biology is destiny.
Moreover, the purpose of surrogacy is different then that for
prostitution, as surrogacy contracts are designed to bring a much-
wanted child into the world that could otherwise not be born.
184
Surrogacy should be viewed simply as one method used for the
conception of children by consumers in the infertility market.' 85
Intended parents do not want a weak woman they are able to exploit,
but instead want an intelligent, independent, thinking woman who
will take care of her health and the health of the growing child.' 86
Also, payment for surrogacy will be further motivation for women to
take excellent care of themselves because they are taking care of
someone else's child.' 87 All parties benefit with the right to contract
in the infertility market, and if such contracts are not enforced legal
uncertainty would dissuade many people would could benefit from
commercial surrogacy.
88
3. The Infertility Market
Opponents to surrogacy argue that it violates the Thirteenth
Amendment because it is, in essence, the sale of babies. 8 9 The idea
of selling children is abhorrent and against the constitutional
amendment prohibiting slavery and the selling of an individual, and
enforcing surrogacy contracts leading to the break-up of a family
unity is what people found most repulsive about slavery in the first
place. 90 Allowing commercial surrogacy constitutes the sale of
children, and surrogate children become commodities. 191 Opponents
182 Kerian, supra note 2, at 163.
181 Id. at 152.
184 Watson, supra note 120, at 546.
185 Kerian, supra note 2, at 152.
186 Watson, supra note 120, at 545.
187 Id. at 549.
188 Kerian, supra note 2, at 152.
189 Id. at 153.
190 Id.
'9' Id. at 154.
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argue that delivering the "product" becomes the bottom line, and
because final payment is dependent upon the surrogate handing over
the child, commercial surrogacy is baby selling.' 92 Because a
substantial portion is paid for the surrogate's willingness to waiver
her maternal rights, money is held in escrow until these rights are
terminated, and if she miscarries or has a stillborn the fee is less.' 
93
Such evidence indicates the surrogate is selling the baby to the
intended parents.1
9 4
One author, an opponent of surrogacy, argues that because the
commercial surrogate has neither money nor vital fluids the surrogate
"contributes mere egg and environment" and is merely stock that is
purchased and viewed as raw material from which a child is
manufactured.195 Eventually surrogacy will re-institutionalize a male
genetic destiny where the primary market is a spermatic one and the
new definition of fatherhood is created by the capability to
ejaculate. 196 It is argued that commercial surrogacy violates public
policy by placing a market value on women's reproductive
capabilities and the children born as a result of surrogacy.197 Women
are used as fetal containers, which exploits the poor because
opponents of surrogacy assume only poor women will want to be
surrogates and only because of the fee they will be paid. 98Although
persons who purchase fertility services are participants in a
commercial market, they likely do not view themselves in such a
way. 199 Rather, they are on a quest to find a fertility service or
procedure that allows them the joy of creating a child.2 0 0 And women
who receive a fee for their fertility service not only consider the
economic value of their choice but usually their primary reason for
192 Id.
193 Scott B. Rae, The Ethics of Commercial Surrogate Motherhood 64
(Praeger, 1994).
194 Id.
195 RAYMOND, supra note 3, at 31 (arguing that In re Baby M created a
spermatic market because the father, as a sperm contributor, was given custody;
and, because a man has both money and the vital fluid that determines who is
awarded custody, his sperm are the liquid assets that give him control).
196 RAYMOND, supra note 3, at 35.
197 Kerian, supra note 2, at 154.
198 Richey, supra note 3, at 190.
199 SPAR, supra note 1, at 49.
200 Id.
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choosing to become surrogates is the desire to help an individual or
couple who desperately want a child.20 ' Many women feel
empowered with the ability to create life and the assumption that they
are being exploited is demeaning to surrogates who view their role as
positive. 02
While sperm donation has been a commercial market since
the 1970s, the market for women's reproductive capabilities is newer
and unreasonably far more controversial.20 3 IVF is now appropriately
being used to source donor eggs for infertile individuals or couples,
just as artificial insemination relied on donated sperm. 20 4 In addition,
the ability to differentiate between surrogate and egg provider (rather
than finding one woman willing to contribute both, and with whom
the intended individual or couple were satisfied) increased the price
of eggs, giving women yet another incentive to contribute to the ART
market. As long as egg donation remained truly altruistic, it
experienced severe shortages, because a healthy young woman is
hardly willing to put herself at risk to help an infertile stranger.20 6
The motivation to help others is complex and compensating women
for their help makes common and economical sense.
Similarly, commercial surrogacy reduces the legal and
emotional risks traditionally associated with surrogacy by using IVF
to remove the traditional tie connecting egg, womb, and mother.20 7
Therefore, women become more willing to provide for the ART
208
market, allowing it to flourish. This willingness permits the supply
of both eggs and wombs to increase for those in desperate need of
them. Commercial surrogates are merely carrying another
individual or couple's child, rather than genetically contributing to
the creation and gestation of a child, and as a result are compensated
for a very different type of service.210 As in compensation for
201 Richey, supra note 3, at 190.
202 Id.; Watson, supra note 120, at 545.
203 SPAR, supra note 1, at 36, 41.
214 Id. at 42.
205 Id. at 81.
206 Id. at 43.
207 Id.
208 SPAR, supra note 1, at 43.
209 Id. at 80.
210 Id.
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donated eggs, women do not have an inherent incentive to endure the
physical and emotional consequences of gestational surrogacy for
complete strangers, it makes sense to pay and seek women who want
to and are willing to participate.
211 
'
B. PGD: Another Hope for Healthy Children
PGD is troubling to some because it takes the infertility
market to a new level; eventually, it could be used for couples that
are not infertile, not genetically at-risk, beyond even savior
siblings.212 One concern of those opposed to PGD is whether the use
of such a procedure will lead to rich people designing perfect
children, while the poor would be consigned to chance." But
potential parents should not be consigned to throwing a genetic dice
because of potential problems that cannot even be realized at this
214time.
Choices about the genetic composition of future children of
individuals and couples, who desperately want a child, should be left
to the prospective parents as their right to privacy. 21 5 This perspective
acknowledges that the outcome of a person's reproductive choice
impacts that person or persons more significantly than any other
person involved and in addition respects that individual or couples
reproductive liberty. 21 6 Respecting people's reproductive private
rights means a person is free from having to ask to create a wanted
child.217 Before the State takes the choices about conception and
child rearing away from the prospective parents, good policy reasons
should be required, otherwise liberty from state control and an
advocacy of neutrality, when it comes to the use of PGD and other
types of ART, should be the policy of the state because this is an area
of life that concerns an individual's right to autonomy.
218
211 Id. at 87.
212 Id. at 119.
213 SPAR, supra note 1, at 100.
214 Id. at 114.
215 GAVAGHAN, supra note 73, at 4.
216 Id. at 207.
217 Id. at 39.
218 Id. at 4, 39.
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Another argument against PGD is the "slippery slope" one;
opponents argue that the use of PGD will lead toward a world where
parents choose to create perfect children, a concern of some who fear
that the use of PGD will lead to the horrific results of Hitler's eugenic
ideas.219 However, the reason intended parents go through the
arduous process of using several different ART procedures is that
they want children who look like them, not some Aryan ideal
formulated by a mad dictator. 220 The use of PGD involves an
expensive and intricate process that people are unlikely to use in
order to have a child with a certain color of eyes, especially when
they have at least a one in four chance of doing so the natural way,
given the choice "most people would rather have sex."
221
In addition, people cannot pass on genes they do not have;
people cannot "design" babies, they can only choose the best
candidate from pre-embryos created from their own gametes. 222 The
use of PGD by individuals should be a private decision; therefore, it
would be different from attempts by a State to control its citizens by
espousing the supposed desirability of the perfect person. 223 The
solution to ethical concerns surrounding PGD does not need to be
extreme, but rather a differentiation between PGD that selects against
undesired genetic mutations and PGD that selects for preferred
genetic characteristics. 224 In order to control future "ethically
unacceptable genetic consumerism" some guidelines need to be
established, as they have been in Illinois, setting out policy
statements and implications for gestational surrogacy that are
acceptable.225
V. Illinois Implications In Particular
llinois' Gestational Surrogacy Act is a special statute because
if a woman meets the eligibility requirements she is not presumed to
219 Abstract, Wolfram Henn, Consumerism in Prenatal Diagnosis: A Challenge
for Ethical Guidelines, 26 Med Ethics 444 (2000), 16 ISSUEs L. & MED. 298, 298
(2001).
220 GAVAGHAN, supra note 73, at 8; SPAR, supra note 1, at 105.
221 SPAR, supra note 1, at 127.
222 GAVAGHAN, supra note 73, at 8.
223 SPAR, supra note 1, at 124.
224 Id. at 126.
225 Abstract, supra note 219, at 298.
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be the mother even though she gives birth to the child.226 The act
does not provide for the gestational surrogate to change her mind,
which is troublesome on the one hand.227 However, because intent of
the parties controls under the act the parties receive what they
expected when entering into the agreement, after full disclosure and
consultation regarding the IVF procedure before implantation of the
embryo. 228 Knowing the legal ramifications, and knowing these will
always be the same ramifications, will ensure that the consuming
parties thoroughly process what the procedure entails, and this benefit
outweighs potential change of intent.229
In addition, the gestational mother would not be birthing the
child but for the individual or couple, as it was not her gametes that
contributed to the conception, and surrogates should be thoroughly
screened before impregnated ensuring their mental health allows
them to complete the procedure as intended. 2 30 Disallowing
gestational surrogacy because a few sensational cases highlight an
unusual retraction of a prearranged agreement is more harmful then
allowing people the right to privacy and to be consumers of all ART
procedures available in the conception and raising of their children.
Another concern is that the Illinois act expressly allows for
reasonable compensation to the surrogate for her services, where
other states are very specific about what the surrogate can be
compensated for or disallow compensation. 231 However, allowing
payment effectively recognizes the surrogate's time and effort spent
furthering the efforts of the intended parents' quest for a biological
232
child.2 2 The commercial context of surrogacy exists as part of the
contract but the idea of commodifying women or children is not
226 Richey, supra note 3, at 173.
227 Snyder & Byrn, supra note 11, at 654.
2218 Id. at 655.
229 Less than one percent of surrogate mothers later want to change her mind
and keep the child. Richey, supra note 3, at 191. For such infertile individuals and
couples and the women who surrogate their child, certainty in the law is a desired
objective. H. Joseph Gitlin, New Law Makes Illinois Friendly for Surrogacy,
11/22/04 CHI. DAILY L. BULL. 6, at 28 (2004).
230 Richey, supra note 3, at 179.
231 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/25(d)(3)-(4) (West 2007); Richey, supra note 3, at
185.
232 Behm, supra note 181, at 602.
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inherently part of that contract.233 Reasonable compensation as part
of a contract should be enforceable as "based on the notion of
autonomous responsible persons making binding promises" before
the conception of the child.234
A third major concern is the ease that a pre-birth parent-child
relationship is established and the process of acquiring a birth
certificate compared to other states, such as New Hampshire, were a
birth certificate cannot be signed until seventy-two hours after the
child's birth, which gives the surrogate time to change her mind.235
The provisions of the Illinois act are more easily met because it
requires no state residency, parental rights can be determined before
birth, and the birth certificate can be issued without a court
proceeding. 236 But, as stated above, a gestational surrogate has no
genetic relation to the child, and her right to change her mind
therefore lessens and is overshadowed by the ability of all infertile
couples to have the chance to create a biological child through
procedures available to them on the infertility market. A state statute
recognizing that surrogacy is a generous service some women
provide that should be generously compensated for aids the
availability of gestational surrogacy as an ART procedure.
VI. Conclusion
In conclusion, Illinois' Gestational Surrogacy Act is an
enlightened view regarding women's right to use their bodies as they
see fit, even if that involves being paid to give birth to someone else's
child. The fear opponents have regarding exploitation and possible
slippery slopes of commodification do not stand up to thoughtful
analysis regarding infertile individual and couple's consumer rights
to use assisted reproductive technology including technology that
gives them the best chance of having a healthy child (such as PGD),
their right to privacy regarding conception and raising their biological
children, and the surrogate's right to contract and her right to privacy
regarding the use of her reproductive capabilities. As long as states
carefully regulate such reproductive technologies so that public
policy, i.e. children have the right to parental care, is not violated,
people should have the right to create children through commercial
233 SHALEV, supra note 169, at 166.
234 Id.
235 Richey, supra note 3, at 180.
236 Gitlin, supra note 229, at 2.
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procedures available to them. Also, women, as economic beings
should have the right to assist such individuals and couples.
Prohibiting surrogacy would result in women's concession to
governmental infringement on matters that are best left to the
individual.237
Gestational contracts are written as other contracts are, in
order to arrange an exchange, this exchange can be seen either as a
commodity or a gift, and surrogacy contracts can be written so that
the resulting child is seen as a precious gift one woman gives
another.238 Legislatures can regulate surrogacy contracts so that the
child is a gift, but the surrogate's gestation of the child is a service to
the couple; this avoids commodification of children and does not
violate public policy. 239 The fee should be for the service a surrogate
provides and the expenses she incurs, but the fee should not be tied to
the termination of her parental rights so that women are not deprived
of compensation for a valued service, but the fee should not be tied to
the termination of her parental rights, therefore if she has no parental
rights, as in Illinois, she cannot terminate them. 240 In fact, such
contracts reaffirm public policy because they definitively articulate,
before the child is born, who will the support the child as it grows up.
Illinois' Gestational Surrogacy Act is a good example of such
legislation, the gestational surrogate does not give up parental rights,
in fact she is presumed not to have any, and it expressly allows
compensation for the service she does provide.
241
The fears that opponents to surrogates raise are very similar to
fears opponents to contraceptive devices had in 1938.242 Back then
contraception devices were the surrogate motherhood debates of
today; birth control was viewed as an "aberration of nature,"
however, the demand for contraception was too strong and a market
243subsequently evolved. Such a market for commercial surrogacy is
and should evolve in the future. The ability to use PGD, to choose
among genetic combinations, to choose the types of ART procedures
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they want to consume, how to conceive, as well as choosing the
results, are the possibilities that people desire and the control over
their private lives they deserve.244
In addition, viewing assisted reproductive technology as a
market allows the state to impose rules that enable such a market to
create a gift without incurring some of the obvious risks inherent in
the technology.245 Regulation of surrogacy keeps such procedures
from going underground on a black market and increases the
likelihood that troubling aspects of such technology is controlled for
public policy reasons. 2 46 And finally, because all these ART
procedures are only technical and social methods in which parents
acquire children that they subsequently raise and love above and
apart from the way their children are conceived.247
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